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Abstract
This paper examines the eﬀects of work-related perks, such as corporate jets and limousines,
nice oﬃces, secretarial staﬀ, etc., on the optimal incentive contract. In a linear contracting
framework, perks characterized by complementarities between production and consumption im-
prove the trade-oﬀ between incentives and insurance that determines the optimal contract for a
risk-averse agent. We show that (i) the perk may be oﬀered even if its direct consumption and
productivity beneﬁts are oﬀset by its cost; (ii) the perk will be oﬀered for free; (iii) agents in
more uncertain production environments will receive more perks; (iv) senior executives should
receive both more perks and stronger explicit incentives; and (v) better corporate governance
can lead ﬁrms to award their CEOs more perks. Our analysis also oﬀers insights into the ﬁrms’
decisions about how much autonomy they should grant to their employees and about optimal
perk provision when managers and workers are organized in teams.
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Work-related perks are ubiquitous. The online betting company Betfair uses performance bonuses
to motivate its employees, but, according to David Yu, Betfair’s COO, the most important incen-
tive Betfair oﬀers its staﬀ is the working environment: "We... do more trades than the London
Stock Exchange... But we are very relaxed: engineers can work from home and have ﬂexible
hours. People like working here and with each other." (Vowler, 2005). Electronic Arts, the world’s
largest independent video game maker, uses perks such as company gym, on-campus masseuse and
acupuncturist, and ﬂexible hours instead of overtime pay to induce its employees to provide over-
time hours (Richtel, 2005). Similar work-related perks with possible incentive eﬀects complement
cash pay in many other companies.
This paper incorporates perks in the principal-agent model, with the aim to examine the re-
lationship between the provision of work-related perks and formal incentives. We focus on perks
which, in Rosen’s (2000) terminology, have "productive consumption" attributes, and which we
deﬁne as non-pecuniary compensation that has productive use and provides intrinsic motivation,
as in the above examples. To emphasize this speciﬁc nature of work-related perks, we at times refer
to them as "technological perks". Our key assumption in modelling this kind of perk is that there
are consumption complementarities between the perk and eﬀort (or time working) in the agent’s
utility function. This is meant to capture what wec o n s i d e rt ob ea ni m p o r t a n tf e a t u r eo fm a n y
work-related perks: an employee is likely to derive a greater utility from a given amount of the perk
if he uses it in the production process longer, more frequently, or more intensively. A CEO is more
likely to derive utility from a corporate jet if she is fully engaged in the company’s operations and
goes frequently on business trips; a pleasant working environment is more valued by employees who
spend longer hours at work; and so on. Such consumption complementarities between the perk and
eﬀort mean that the agent is willing to exert some eﬀort even if he faces no explicit incentives.
1The main economic forces that are at play in our model can be explained as follows: The
incentive eﬀect of the perk allows the principal to decrease the pay-performance sensitivity of the
agent’s explicit incentive contract, which in turn decreases the uncertainty in the agent’s income.
Given that the agent is risk-averse, a lower income uncertainty translates into a lower total expected
pay that he must get to accept the employment contract. This increases the principal’s expected
proﬁt.
Clearly, by focusing on technological perks, we exclude from our analysis some important em-
ployee beneﬁts that have no productivity eﬀects, such as dental insurance and pensions. We believe,
however, that the dual role of technological perks as a consumption good and as a productivity
enhancement tool makes them of special interest, as it is the main source of the controversy sur-
rounding the use of these perks: Following the theoretical arguments of Jensen and Meckling (1976),
some authors stress the possibility of agency problems resulting in excessive perk consumption, es-
pecially when it comes to the companies’ executive oﬃcers (e.g. Yermack (2006)). Others, on the
other hand, highlight the legitimate use of the perks as productivity enhancing and incentive tools
(Rosen (2000); Rajan and Wulf (2006)). Much of this controversy stems from the fact that the
perks’ consumption attributes make them open to misuse by the employees, but their productivity
enhancement attributes make the misuse hard to detect.1
Our framework allows us to shed light on this issue by addressing a number of poorly understood
questions pertaining to the optimal provision of technological perks: If a ﬁrm provides a perk, how
much should the perk be subsidized, that is, at what price should it be sold to the agent? How does
the optimal perk provision depend upon the model’s exogenous parameters, such as the production
1Reﬂecting this controversy, the very term “perk” is somewhat nebulous. While some authors, for example Yermack
(2006), reserve the term for non-productive consumption of in-kind goods and services, others (including Jensen and
Meckling, 1976, Rajan and Wulf, 2006, as well as many popular press writers) allow for both productive and non-
productive uses. Interestingly, a recent SEC proposal regarding the rules regulating the disclosure of executive perks
explicitly avoids providing a deﬁnition of perks, citing the elusiveness of the term (SEC, 2006, p. 6553).
2technology and production uncertainty? What is the relationship between the amount of the perk
and the slope of the agent’s formal incentive contract? How are the optimal price and quantity
of the perk and the employee’s formal incentives aﬀected by the possibility that the employee can
divert the perk for purely personal use? By oﬀering relatively clear-cut answers to these and similar
questions, the model can provide some guidance for future empirical tests attempting to disentangle
the agency and the productivity motives behind the observed patterns of managerial perks. Our
main results are the following:
(1) In some cases, the ﬁrm will ﬁnd it optimal to provide the perk even if it has no direct eﬀect on
the agent’s productivity and the cost of providing the perk is greater than the monetary equivalent
of the utility the agent derives from it. This result highlights the fact that the complementarities
between the perk and eﬀort that are central to our model make perks valuable for their incentive
eﬀects and for the resulting decrease in the salary that the company needs to oﬀer to attract the
agent.
(2) The more uncertain is the production process (as measured by the variance of output) and
the harder it is to monitor and evaluate the agent’s performance, the more valuable are the perk’s
incentive eﬀects and, consequently, the more likely it is that the perk will be provided. This suggests
that we should observe more technological perks in larger ﬁrms, in privately held ﬁrms, in ﬁrms
in the new economy sector, in ﬁrms with many inter-dependent divisions, and in geographically
dispersed ﬁrms.
(3) The existing informal discussions of the productivity theory of perks, such as the one in
Rosen (2000), suggested that productivity enhancing perks should be subsidized by companies, but
were not speciﬁc about how large the subsidy should be. In our framework, it is always optimal
to provide the perk to the employees free of charge.2 This result does not depend upon how much
2Of course, in the end, the agent is always held down to his reservation utility, which means that he pays for the
perks up-front, through a lower salary, as in the standard theory of hedonic prices. When we say the perk is provided
3or how little the perk increases the agent’s productivity. Neither is it aﬀected by allowing for the
possibility that the agent can divert the perk for personal use, such as using a corporate jet for
family trips.
(4) In our theory, the problem of optimal provision of technological perks is a part of a more
complex problem of designing an optimal incentive package in which explicit incentives are in-
tertwined with intrinsic motivation provided by perks. Consequently, the factors that aﬀect the
strength of explicit contracts also play a role in the ﬁrm’s decision to provide perks, so that the
two variables are correlated. For example, ﬁrms with less precise performance measures (e.g. large
ﬁrms) should provide both weaker explicit incentives and more technological perks. Similarly, all
else equal, agents with higher marginal productivities (e.g., the employees with greater skills or
more senior managers) will be oﬀered more powerful explicit incentives, accompanied by greater
amounts of technological perks.
(5) We introduce agency problems in perk consumption by allowing the employee to divert the
perk for purely personal use. Contrary to what one would expect based on Jensen and Meckling’s
(1976) analysis, we show that agency problems in our model lead to less equilibrium perk consump-
tion and to greater fractional ownership by the ﬁrm’s CEO. Thus, better corporate governance can
actually lead ﬁrms to award their managers more perks. These results suggest caution in inter-
preting empirical evidence on CEOs’ perk consumption and on the strength of their incentives as
supporting or refuting the agency theory.
(6) Extending our model in a straightforward way, we show that managers and workers organized
in teams should receive more technological perks. We also discuss the implications of our model
for the optimal degree of employee autonomy.
" f r e eo fc h a r g e " ,w em e a nt h a tt h ea g e n td o e sn o tp a ym o r ef o rt h ep e r ki fh eu s e si tm o r ei n t e n s i v e l y ;e . g . ,t h eC E O
is not asked to share a part of the operation costs incurred when she uses the company aircraft.
41.1. Related literature
For the most part, the literature on employee beneﬁts does not deal with the speciﬁc issues consid-
ered here. The closest papers are Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Oyer (2006). In their seminal
analysis of agency problems in perk consumption, Jensen and Meckling (1976) allow perks to have
a productivity use and to increase the ﬁrm’s value, but they focus exclusively on the implications
of the managers’ ability to misuse the perks. The productivity aspects of the perks appear in their
model only in a very reduced form and therefore do not play any interesting role. Oyer (2006)
uses a simple model of productivity enhancing beneﬁts to show that a beneﬁtw i l lb ep r o v i d e d
more frequently the more it lowers an employee’s cost of eﬀort, and he ﬁnds support for this pre-
diction using data on company provided meals. However, Oyer does not consider formal incentive
contracts, which limits the potential insights from his model.
Our paper is also related to the vast literature on optimal incentive contracts. In particular,
although we consider only one explicit performance measure (the agent’s output), the price the
agent pays for the use of the perk is akin to a weight put on an additional performance measure.
The perk thus plays a similar role in the contract as a second performance measure. This makes
the model formally related to the literature on optimal incentive contracts with multiple perfor-
mance measures, where two recent representative contributions are Baker (2002) and Raith (2005).
However, we focus on diﬀerent issues, not examined elsewhere.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our basic model, but
abstract from agency problems in perk consumption. The analysis of this model follows in Section
3. In Section 4, we introduce agency problems in perk consumption and relate our model to
Jensen and Meckling’s analysis. In Section 5 we oﬀer two applications and extensions of our basic
framework: We consider here the eﬀects of teamwork on perk provision and discuss the implications
of our analysis for the optimal degree of delegation within organizations. Section 6 concludes.
52. The Model
For expositional purposes, we start with a basic model that abstracts from the possibility that
the agent could misuse the perk for purely private consumption. We allow for agency problems in
perk consumption in Section 4, where we also demonstrate that our main results from this section
continue to hold in this richer setting.
The model is based on the linear contract principal-agent framework of Holmström and Milgrom
(1987). Consider a ﬁrm consisting of a risk neutral principal (e.g., the ﬁrm’s owners) and a risk
averse agent (e.g., the CEO) with certainty equivalent reservation income ¯ w. The agent chooses
unobservable action, a ∈ R+, which aﬀects the distribution of the ﬁrm’s output. The principal
oﬀers the agent a formal linear performance contract, which conditions his monetary pay on his
output. In addition, the principal can provide the agent with a technological perk, which the agent
views as a consumption good, i.e., he derives utility from its use, but it also can serve as a non-labor
input in the sense that it may increase the agent’s productivity (a computer, a quiet oﬃce, use of a
company aircraft, etc.). The eﬀectiveness of the agent’s action in improving the expected revenue
depends upon the amount, q,o ft h ep e r kp r o v i d e db yt h eﬁrm, as speciﬁed next.
Technology. If the agent chooses action a and the ﬁrm provides an amount q of the perk, the
ﬁrm’s output is given by
y = β(1 + qm)(a + ε).
Here, β captures the agent’s marginal productivity on the job, but it could also be interpreted as
the marginal productivity of the ﬁrm’s technology, aﬀected by such things as the ﬁrm’s market
power in its product market, its cost eﬀectiveness, and so on. The parameter m measures the eﬀect
of the perk on the agent’s productivity. We will focus on the parameter values such that m ≥ 0,
where m =0allows for the possibility that the perk is a pure consumption good. We would like
6to stress, however, that our conclusions remain unchanged even if m<0,a sl o n ga sm is not too
negative. The model thus also applies to the case where the perk distracts the agent from his duties
and decreases his productivity. Finally, ε is a normally distributed noise term, with zero mean and
variance σ2.N o t et h a tb o t hβ and q enter multiplicatively with ε. This means that the perk does
not simply increase the signal to noise ratio of y as it would if q and ε were additively separable.
The same goes for the agent’s marginal productivity β.3
The perk’s acquisition cost is kq, k ≥ 0, and its operating cost is c(q,a)=θqa, θ>0.4 Thus,
while the acquisition cost does not depend upon the agent’s work intensity, the operation cost
does. In this sense, the acquisition cost can be thought of as a ﬁxed cost of obtaining a given
amount of the perk and the operation cost is the variable cost associated with using the perk in
production and/or consumption. For example, in the case of a corporate jet, this would be any cost
that depends upon the intensity with which the jet is used, such as the costs of fuel, maintenance,
perhaps insurance, the plane’s depreciation, and so on.
Preferences. The agent’s utility as a function of his monetary income, w, his action, a, and his
perk consumption, q,i sg i v e nb y
U(w)=−e−r[w+γqa−g(a)],
where r is the agent’s coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. The term γqa is his monetary equivalent
of utility from consuming q units of the perk, where γ>0 is a parameter that allows us to vary
3Arguably, the multiplicative speciﬁcation is more realistic than the additive one, even though the latter has
been used more frequently in the literature. If an agentb e c o m e sm o r ep r o d u c t i v eb e c a u s eh ei sa s s i g n e dt oam o r e
productive technology or receives more perks, it seems reasonable to expect that the variance of his output would
increase. However, our main reason for choosing the multiplicative speciﬁcation is to separate the incentive eﬀects
of β and q from their eﬀects on the signal-to-noise ratio of the performance measure. In an additive world, β and q
would increase the signal-to-noise ratio of y, which would make the perk even more valuable to the principal than in
our model. This eﬀect, though, is well understood.
4The assumption that the perk’s cost is deterministic does not play any role in our analysis and is adopted purely
to simplify exposition.
7how much the agent likes the perk. The complementarity between q and a in the agent’s utility,
i m p l i e db yt h i ss p e c i ﬁcation, is a key feature of our model, without which the perk would only
aﬀect the optimal incentive contract through the productivity parameter m.T h i sw o u l dm a k et h e
perk’s eﬀects indistinguishable from the eﬀects of a standard production capital.5
The term g(a) indicates the agent’s monetary equivalent of disutility from providing action a.
The function g is diﬀerentiable, increasing and convex.
Contracting. The ﬁrm and the agent sign a formal incentive contract, according to which (i)
the agent’s pay, w, is a linear function of his output and (ii) the agent is charged a portion p ≥ 0
of the perk’s operating cost.6 That is,
w(y)=s + by − pc(q,a),
where s is the agent’s base salary and b is the piece-rate, measuring the strength of the formal
incentives. We do not allow for p<0. This restriction is meant to capture the fact that if the
agent’s pay increased in c, he could game the contract by taking some unobservable action that
would increase the costs incurred by the ﬁrm without imposing personal costs on himself.7 As
will become clear later, an important implication of this assumption will be that, even though the
principal can use her knowledge of q and c(q,a) to infer a, this will not help her to force the agent
to take the optimal action.
5Oyer (2006) also introduces a complementarity between perk and eﬀort, but it is in the agent’s cost of eﬀort
function. Such complementarity does not have the incentive eﬀects present here, which makes his perks hard to
diﬀerentiate from pure production capital. In particular, our speciﬁcation guarantees that the agent is willing to use
the in-kind good even in the absence of explicit incentives. This is not true if the in-kind good simply lowers the
agent’s cost of eﬀort.
6S i n c ew ea r ei n t e r e s t e di nt h ee ﬀects of p on the agent’s incentives, we ignore the possibility that the agent could
also be charged for part of the perk’s acquisition cost kq. Such a payment would simply represent a transfer equivalent
to a decrease in the agent’s salary, s, and hence it would not aﬀect incentives.
7For example, if the agent’s pay increased with the electricity bill that he runs up using his computer, he would
simply leave the computer turned on at all times. Formally, this could be easily incorporated in the model by assuming
that there is another action, a
0, that the agent can take, and that a
0 has a similar eﬀect on c(q,.) as a,b u ti ti m p o s e s
no cost on the agent.
8Note that when q =0 , the problem collapses into a version of the standard principal agent






Observe in particular that b∗
0 is independent of the agent’s productivity parameter, β.T h i s i s
because, as we have already explained, β increases not only the agent’s productivity but also the
variance of his output, and these two eﬀects cancel out in determining the optimal piece rate.
Again, we have chosen this speciﬁcation purposefully, to highlight that any eﬀect β will have on
the optimal incentive contract will be driven by the presence of the perk.
3. The Analysis
The agent’s certainty equivalent is
CE(s,b,q,p)=γqa+ s + bβ(1 + qm)a −
1
2
rb2β2(1 + qm)2σ2 − pqθa − g(a),
so that his optimal choice of a is given by the ﬁrst order condition
g0(a)=m a x {0,bβ(1 + qm) − pqθ + γq}. (1)
Thus, as one would expect, the higher is the price the agent is charged for the perk, the lower is
the level of eﬀort he chooses to provide, given any piece rate b.
Because the principal is the residual claimant, her problem is to design for the agent a compre-
hensive incentive package (b,q,p), balancing the explicit incentives of the formal contract with the
9implicit incentives provided by the perk, so as to maximize the expected total surplus,
TS(b,q,p) ≡ βa+ qa(γ + βm− θ) −
1
2
rb2β2(1 + qm)2σ2 − g(a) − kq − ¯ w,
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (1). We will assume that this is a concave problem.8
Given that our goal is to focus on the incentive beneﬁts of perks, we restrict our attention
to parameter values such that the direct beneﬁts due to increased productivity and consumption
utility derived from the perk are not suﬃcient to oﬀset the perk’s operating costs.
Assumption 1: θ>β m+ γ.
Under this assumption, providing the perk is clearly suboptimal, unless the perk can improve
the eﬃciency of the optimal incentive contract. Assumption 1 also guarantees that the optimal
quantity of the perk will be ﬁnite.9
Let A(b,q,p) ≡ ∂TS
∂a denote the net marginal beneﬁt to the principal of increased eﬀort. Sub-
stituting for g0(a) from (1), we can write
A(b,q,p)=( 1− b)β(1 + qm) − (1 − p)θq.


















A(b,q,p) − (θ − βm− γ)a − b2mβ2(1 + qm)rσ2 − k. (4)
8As u ﬃcient, but not necessary condition, for this is that g
000(.) ≥ 0.
9If the inequality in Assumption 1 were reversed, it would be optimal to provide the perk not only for incentive
and risk-sharing purposes, but also for its direct consumption and productivity values. Of course, in the comparative
statics exercises, the consumption and productivity enhancement motivations are going to play a role even under
Assumption 1.
















bβm − pθ + γ
g00(a)
.
Lemma 1. If A(b∗,q∗,p ∗) ≤ 0,t h e ni tm u s tb eq∗ =0 .
The proof for this lemma is in the appendix, as are the proofs of all our subsequent results.
According to Lemma 1, the proﬁt-maximizing amount of the perk, q∗, can be positive only if
A(b∗,q∗,p ∗) > 0. In such a case, (3) implies that ∂TS
∂p < 0 for all p>0,s ot h a tp∗ =0and
A(b∗,q∗,p ∗)=( 1− b∗)β(1 + q∗m) − θq∗.T h e nb∗ and q∗ solve (2) and (4), which together yield
b∗ =








[(θ − βm− γ)a∗ + k][1 + rσ2g00(a∗)]
(θ − βm)γrσ2 . (6)
Comparing expression (5) with b∗
0, the slope of the optimal contract when no perks are provided,
reveals that the eﬀect of the perk on the optimal explicit incentives is captured by the negative term
−θq∗/β(1 + q∗m) in the numerator of b∗. Because the perk itself has incentive eﬀects, this crowds
out formal incentives, which is reﬂected in a smaller slope of the incentive contract. These results
are summarized and the optimal contract is further characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. It is always optimal to set p∗ =0 .A l s o ,t h e r ee x i s t saγ∗ > 0 such that
(i) if γ>γ ∗,t h e nb∗ and q∗ are given by (5) and (6) respectively, where q∗ > 0 and b∗
0 >b ∗ > 0;
(ii) if γ ≤ γ∗,t h e nb∗ = b∗
0 = 1
1+rσ2g00(a∗) > 0 and q∗ =0 .
Proposition 1 provides two insights into the optimal provision of a technological perk. First,
11the ﬁrm may ﬁnd it optimal to provide the perk even if the perk’s cost is greater than its direct
beneﬁts represented by the manager’s consumption utility from the perk plus the direct increase in
his productivity (i.e., even if θ>γ+ βm, which is Assumption 1).10 For these parameter values,
the main motivation for providing the perk is that it improves the risk-sharing properties of the
optimal contract. Since the incentive eﬀects of the perk increase in γ,t h e yc a no ﬀset the marginal
cost of providing the perk (net of the perk’s marginal consumption and productivity improvement
values, i.e., (θ − βm − γ)a + k)o n l yi fγ is suﬃciently high. Hence the condition γ>γ ∗ in the
proposition. Notice that this requires that γ>0, that is, the good indeed needs to be a perk rather
than pure production capital. On the other hand, it is not necessary for the argument that the
perk improves the agent’s productivity: As long as γ>γ ∗, providing the perk is optimal even if
the perk decreases the agent’s productivity, i.e., even if m<0.
T h es e c o n di n s i g h to ﬀered by Proposition 1 is that the perk should always be provided to the
agent for free (i.e., p∗ =0 ).11 This seems to be an empirically sound prediction, and one that shows
that the standard explanation for providing work related perks is incomplete. According to the
standard reasoning (found, for example, in Rosen, 2000), a ﬁrm needs to subsidize a productivity
enhancing perk if the employees do not internalize all the beneﬁts from the productivity increase
brought about by the perk. This argument, however, only implies zero price for the perk in the
extreme case where the agent’s pay is completely unresponsive to his productivity. Otherwise, if
the agent internalizes a part of the productivity increase through an increase in his pay, the logic
of the standard argument seems to suggest that he should be charged a positive price for the perk,
10In order to guarantee that γ
∗ <θ− βm, so that Assumption 1 is not violated, it must be that the perk’s ﬁxed
cost is not too high, k<
βrσ2(θ−βm)
1+rσ2g00(a∗
0). However, even when this condition does not hold, it is still true that the ﬁrm
w a n t st op r o v i d et h ep e r ki fγ>γ
∗, as claimed in the proposition.
11If the agent could choose q,i tm i g h tb eo p t i m a lt os e tp>0, to curb his excessive consumption of the perk. Our
maintained assumption that the perk is awarded to the agent by the ﬁrm may be less realistic in the case of very
powerful CEOs. However, if the ﬁrm’s board of directors is so weak that it cannot control q, it is not clear why it
would be strong enough to control p. Thus, while this is clearly an interesting variation on our analysis, it is outside
of the scope of this paper, because it would require a diﬀerent model — perhaps along the lines of Hermalin and
Weisbach (1998) — that would allow us to capture the relative powers of the ﬁrm’s CEO and its board of directors.
12lest he does not overuse it. In contrast, our analysis shows that once the optimal adjustment in
the incentive contract is taken into account, it is always optimal to oﬀer the perk for free. The
reason is that charging the agent for the use of the perk would discourage him from using it and
hence mute his incentives, as can be seen from the ﬁrst order condition (1). Therefore, stronger
incentives would have to be provided through an increase in the slope, b∗, of the explicit contract.
This, however, would impose additional risk on the agent and hence decrease eﬃciency.
As a ﬁnal note on Proposition 1, observe that the result p∗ =0says that the principal will have
no use for her knowledge of a that she infers from her information about q and c(q,a).I n t u i t i v e l y ,
this information would only be useful if the agent’s pay could be made an increasing function of
the cost function c, which is precluded by our restriction p ≥ 0.
We now turn our attention to how the optimal incentive contract and the optimal provision of
the perk depend on the economic environment in which the ﬁrm operates. In general, the ﬁrm’s
decision whether or not to provide a technological perk, how much of the perk to provide, and what
should be the optimal slope of the incentive contract, can all depend on the model’s parameters in
a complicated way, determined by the third derivative of the agent’s cost of eﬀort function g(.).T o
avoid these complications, we will from now on assume that g(a)=a2/2,s ot h a tg000(.)=0 .
Proposition 2.
(i) A technological perk is more likely to be provided (γ∗ is smaller) the greater are β, γ, m, r,
and σ2 and the lesser are k and θ.
(ii) The optimal amount of the perk, q∗, increases with β, m, γ, r,a n dσ2 and decreases in k and
θ. The optimal pay-performance sensitivity of the incentive contract, b∗,i n c r e a s e sw i t hβ, k,
and θ and decreases in γ, r, σ2, m (and in q∗).
Along with several expected predictions, Proposition 2 yields two novel and potentially testable
13comparative static results. First, it predicts that the use of technological in-kind compensation
should be more prevalent in more uncertain economic environments. The perk allows the ﬁrm
to improve the incentives-versus-insurance trade-oﬀ that determines the optimal explicit incentives
and this eﬀect is more valuable in more uncertain environments, in which the ineﬃciencies caused by
the trade-oﬀ are greater. Similarly, companies in which monitoring and evaluating the employees’
individual performance is harder should oﬀer more technological perks. These observations suggest
the types of organizations that should be more likely to provide top of the line computers, generous
secretarial support, nice oﬃces, the use of a company plane, and other technological perks:
(1) Privately held ﬁrms. A public company’s stock price provides an informative measure of
performance, not available in privately held ﬁrms. Privately held ﬁrms should therefore ﬁnd it
harder to evaluate their employees, which should make technological perks more valuable to them.
(2) Firms with multiple inter-dependent divisions where coordination is important and where
the actions taken by the employees in one division aﬀect the performance of the other divisions.12
(3) Firms that are geographically dispersed and therefore ﬁnd it harder to monitor employees.
Consistent with this interpretation, Rajan and Wulf (2006) ﬁnd that company planes are more
common in geographically dispersed ﬁrms. Since this could also be because planes are more useful
in geographically dispersed companies (which would be captured by a greater m in our model),
more direct support for this prediction would come from technological perks that are not travel
related.
(4) Large ﬁrms, as these tend to have more noisy measures of individual performance (Schaefer
(1998); Baker and Hall (2004)). The existing empirical studies of non-monetary compensation
typically examine beneﬁts that are more broadly deﬁned than our technological perks, and therefore
can only provide indirect support for our theory. With this caveat in mind, the prediction that
12We would like to thank Julie Wulf for suggesting this and the next example.
14large ﬁrms should provide more perks appears to be consistent with available evidence: numerous
studies have documented that large ﬁrms oﬀer more non-wage compensation than small ﬁrms (e.g.,
Brown et al (1990), Montgomery and Shaw (1997), Oyer (2006), and Rajan and Wulf (2006)). This
prediction is similar to what one would expect in the presence of economies of scale in perk provision
(Rosen (2000)). The empirically relevant distinction between our theory and the economies of scale
argument is that in our model, the decision whether to provide the perk need not depend upon the
actual number of employees within the organization that receive it.
(5) New economy ﬁrms. These ﬁrms tend to be more R&D intensive, have greater market-
to-book ratios, and grow more rapidly than the old economy ﬁrms (Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker
(2003)). All of these characteristics could make it hard to observe a manager’s marginal contri-
bution.13 Rajan and Wulf (2006) ﬁnd that the ﬁrm’s growth prospects have a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect on perk provision (although market-to-book ratio does not). This prediction also seems to be
in accord with the popular belief that new economy ﬁrms oﬀer more and better perks, especially
productivity enhancing ones.14
In addition, because perk provision in our model is intertwined with the problem of designing
the optimal incentive contract, all else equal, we would expect the greater amount of perks in the
above types of companies to be accompanied by weaker explicit incentives. This is consistent, for
example, with the fact that larger ﬁrms have been shown to oﬀer weaker formal incentives, at least
to their top executives (Schaefer (1998); Baker and Hall (2004)).15 However, this prediction may
13Both R&D expenditures and the market-to-book ratio have been used by empirical researchers to proxy for the
degree of diﬃculty in measuring managerial performance in a ﬁrm (e.g., Kole, 1997).
14For example, Standen (2001) describes how the $700 Aeron oﬃce chairs “renowned throughout the oﬃce universe
for their ergonomically correct luxury” became extremely popular with technology ﬁrms. “According to the new-
economy ethos, work would be fun; it would be comfortable and ergonomic...”. Similarly, Terry (2001) writes that
“Dotcom companies became infamous for pioneering many ... perks, including catered lunches and free car-wash
services.... At the core of all this ... is anything that focuses on time, because time is such a huge commodity.”
15This prediction can also be obtained from the standard principal-agent model in the absence of perks, as long as
one assumes that the variance of the agent’s output increases faster with the ﬁrm’s size than his marginal productivity.
See Baker and Hall (2004) for a detailed discussion of this model.
15not be robust in environments where greater uncertainty is associated with greater reliance on the
employee’s speciﬁc knowledge, as in such environments the relationship between uncertainty and
explicit incentives is typically ambiguous (see, e.g., Prendergast (2002), Raith (2005), and Zabojnik
(1996)).
The second comparative static result worth noting concerns the eﬀects of the agent’s produc-
tivity (as measured by β)o nb∗ and q∗. In contrast to the benchmark case with no perk, if the
perk is provided then more productive employees (say, senior managers versus rank-and-ﬁle work-
ers) receive stronger explicit incentives.16 More importantly, more productive employees are also
more likely to receive technological perks and the amounts of the perks they receive are greater.17
The perk becomes more valuable as β increases, for two reasons. First, for a given b, β magniﬁes
the eﬀect of the perk on the agent’s incentives ( ∂2a
∂q∂β > 0), as well as the net marginal beneﬁt
of increased eﬀort (
∂A(b,q,p)
∂β > 0). Second, it directly improves the agent’s productivity, through
the term βmqa. This prediction is in accord with the conclusion in Rajan and Wulf (2006) that
productivity considerations seem to play an important role in determination of managerial perks in
major U.S. public companies. The prediction is also consistent with Krueger and Summers’ (1988)
empirical ﬁnding that inter-industry wage diﬀerentials, with more capital intensive industries typ-
ically paying higher wages, are magniﬁed when one accounts for non-wage beneﬁts. This ﬁnding
suggests that more capital intensive industries tend to provide more fringe beneﬁts (again, more
broadly deﬁned than in our paper).
Finally, our conclusions ﬁt well with the common perception that senior managers receive more
perks than the average employee.18 Of course, this relationship could also be driven by a pure
16This prediction also obtains in the standard model without perks, if one assumes that β does not aﬀect the
variance, i.e., y = βa+ε. In this case, the relationship is driven by the fact that β improves the signal to noise ratio
of y.
17Since q can alternatively be interpreted as the perk’s quality, the model also predicts that senior managers should
receive technological perks of higher quality.
18Rajan and Wulf (2006) document that CEOs in their sample receive more perks than lower-level managers.
16income eﬀect, wherein senior managers demand more perks simply because they have greater wealth.
Thus, in testing the productivity theory, one would ideally want to control for the managers’ wealth.
Also, the income based explanation applies to all employee beneﬁts, whether they are work-related
or not. Hence, a test that would ﬁnd a stronger relationship between manager seniority and
the amount of technological perks than between seniority and non-work related perks could be
interpreted as lending support to the productivity theory.
4. Agency problems in perk consumption
As we have argued earlier, the controversial nature of many perks stems partly from the ﬁne line that
separates their consumption and production uses. Provision of work-related in kind compensation
might induce the agent to take unproductive actions, in cases where such actions would generate
personal beneﬁt. For example, the provision of a chauﬀeured limousine might encourage a CEO
to use the car for purely personal purposes. The provision of a computer with high speed internet
access might result in the agent wasting time surﬁng the web. This is the standard agency problem
in perk consumption studied by Jensen and Meckling (1976). In this section, we introduce into our
basic framework such agency problems and contrast our model with the Jensen-Meckling theory.
However, in keeping up with the optimal contracting approach, we depart from Jensen and Meckling
by assuming that the agent can only misuse the perk once it is awarded to him by the ﬁrm —
he cannot unilaterally decide to obtain the perk without the ﬁrm’s consent. This is a realistic
assumption for most employees, although it may not ﬁt some very powerful top executives in ﬁrms
with weak boards of directors (see footnote 11). Our approach here is in line with recent empirical
studies on executive perks (Rajan and Wulf, 2006; Yermack, 2006) that seem to assume that the
perks enjoyed by CEOs and other top executives have been awarded to them.19
19For example, in Rajan and Wulf (2006, p.2) the authors state several times that a particular ﬁrm has oﬀered or
oﬀers an executive a perk. In Yermack (2006) similar language is used (on p.3 and elsewhere).
17Let a1 represent a productive action and let a2 represent a non-productive action, where the
variable a1 takes the place of a in the basic model. Action a2 only generates a personal beneﬁt γ2a2
to the agent, while imposing the same marginal cost on the principal as activity a1. The parameter
γ2 can be thought of as a measure of agency problems in the ﬁrm: the greater is γ2,t h em o r et h e
employee likes to divert the perk for personal use or the easier it is for him to do so. (In the latter
case, γ2 captures — in a reduced form — the ease with which the agent’s use of the perk can be
monitored by the ﬁrm’s owners.)
Assumption 2: θ>β m+ γ1 + γ2.
Assumption 2 is the analogue of Assumption 1; it says that the direct consumption and productivity
beneﬁts from the perk are not enough to oﬀset the cost of providing the perk. Thus, it is not eﬃcient
to provide the perk unless it helps the principal to design a better incentive contract.














rb2β2(1+qm)2σ2 −pqθ(a1 +a2)−g(a1,a 2),
and his ﬁrst order conditions for ai choice are
a1 =m a x {0,γ1q + bβ(1 + qm) − pqθ}, (7)
a2 =m a x {0,γ2q − pqθ}. (8)
20We assume additive separability in the two actions in order to get clean comparative statics results. Our conclusion
in Proposition 3 that the perk should again be oﬀered for free easily extends to more general cost functions. For
example, the result continues to hold if g12(a1,a 2) 6=0 ,a sl o n ga sg11 = g22 and g12 6= g11 (where the latter is






2 + da1a2,w h e r ed is a constant.
18The ﬁrm’s owners again maximize the total surplus, which in this case is given by






rb2β2(1 + qm)2σ2 − qθ(a1 + a2) − kq − g(a1,a 2) − ¯ w.
Under what conditions will the ﬁrm provide the perk in the presence of agency problems? Also,
will the ﬁrm now charge for the in kind good in equilibria where it is provided? Let x∗∗ denote an
equilibrium variable in the present setting. We have
Proposition 3. Suppose the manager can use the perk in a non-productive activity, i.e. γ2 > 0.
Then p∗∗ =0 ,a n dq∗∗ > 0 if and only if q∗ > 0. Moreover, q∗∗ <q ∗ and b∗
0 >b ∗∗ >b ∗.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that the main conclusions of Proposition 1 remain unchanged when
the agent can divert the perk for private consumption. That is, it remains optimal for the ﬁrm to
oﬀer the perk free of charge and to provide it under the same parameter values (i.e., for γ1 ≥ γ∗)a s
when the purely private consumption was not possible. In particular, this means that the presence
of agency problems does not enter the ﬁrm’s decision whether to provide the perk. The eﬀect of the
agency problems is manifested only through the optimal amount of the perk that the ﬁrm provides
and through the slope of the optimal incentive contract. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrm optimally responds
to the possibility that the agent can misuse the perk by providing it in a smaller amount (or in
lower quality) and by increasing the slope of the incentive contract. This is demonstrated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4. When the perk can be diverted for personal use, q∗∗ decreases and b∗∗ increases
in γ2. With respect to the rest of the parameters, the comparative statics for q∗∗ and b∗∗ are
t h es a m ea sf o rq∗ and b∗. That is, q∗∗ increases in β, m, γ1, r,a n dσ2 and decreases in k
and θ,w h i l eb∗∗ increases in β, k,a n dθ and decreases in γ, r, σ2, m (and in q∗∗).
19Proposition 4 shows that the comparative statics results of Proposition 2 are preserved in the
present setting with unproductive eﬀort. Thus, all of our empirical predictions discussed earlier
are robust to an extension allowing for agency problems in perk consumption. This allows us to
compare our analysis with the predictions of Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) model. First, based
on Jensen and Meckling’s analysis, greater agency problems (due to, say, greater diﬃculties in
monitoring the CEO’s actions or due to an increase in the CEO’s taste for perks) should lead to
more equilibrium perk consumption, which Jensen and Meckling measure by expenditures on perks.
In contrast, Proposition 4 says that, in our model, greater agency problems (a larger γ2)l e a dt o
fewer perks if their amount is measured by q∗∗, and that the relationship is ambiguous if the amount
of perk consumption is measured by the total expenditures on perks, q∗∗k + q∗∗θ(a∗∗
1 + a∗∗
2 ).21
Another prediction that has been attributed to Jensen and Meckling’s theory is that there should
be a negative relationship between the CEO’s level of perk consumption and his fractional ownership
in the ﬁrm (Yermack, 2006). Thus, an increase in the degree of agency problems (i.e., an increase
in γ2) should lead not only to more perk consumption but also to a smaller fractional ownership
(smaller b∗∗). Again, we obtain exactly the opposite prediction: in our model, b∗∗ increases with
γ2. Strengthening the CEO’s explicit incentives in response to greater agency problems is optimal
in our framework, because this redirects the CEO’s focus from non-productive (a2) to productive
(a1) use of the perk.
The implication of the above conclusions is that one needs to exercise caution when interpreting
empirical evidence on CEO fractional ownership and perk consumption as supporting or refuting
the presence of agency problems in perk consumption. First, our model demonstrates that in
the case of technological perks (such as the use of company aircraft), greater fractional ownership








∗∗, an increase in γ2 pulls it up, while the decrease in q
∗∗ pulls it down. As for a
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1 .
20can actually be associated with more severe agency problems. Similarly, companies with better
corporate governance may be willing to award their CEOs greater amounts of perks, because
they know that the CEO will use the perks to enhance the ﬁrm’s value rather than for personal
consumption.22 Second, the presence of agency problems does not necessarily imply a negative
relationship between the CEO’s explicit incentives and his expenditures on perks, because the
eﬀect of agency problems on the latter is ambiguous. The reverse argument is also true – if
one ﬁnds no signiﬁcant relationship between a CEO’s fractional ownership and his expenditures
on perks (as Yermack, 2006, does for the case of corporate jets), this does not imply absence of
agency problems in perk consumption. These conclusions reinforce the assessment in Rajan and
Wulf (2006, p. 4), who reﬂect on the lack of empirical support for the agency theory in their data
by arguing that "...we need to rethink whether perk consumption should be the canonical example
of systematic forms of agency ... as has been suggested in the past."
The last point worth noting regarding the results in Proposition 4 is that they complement
the conclusions found in the literature on distorted performance measures (Baker, 1992) and on
multitasking (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). These papers provide a theoretical rationale for the
general absence of high-powered explicit incentives within ﬁrms, ﬁrst pointed out by Williamson
(1985). The absence of high-powered incentives within organizations is conspicuous both because
standard principal-agent models seem to predict that agents should face elaborate incentive con-
tracts and because relationships with independent contractors frequently are governed by such
high-powered contracts. Our model also predicts weaker explicit incentives than the standard
model (i.e., b∗∗ <b ∗
0); this is because some incentives are provided indirectly, via work-related
fringe beneﬁts. Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that if Assumption 2 is relaxed (which
22Rajan and Wulf (2006) ﬁnd that governance does not have a clear-cut impact on perk provision in ﬁrms they
study. Consistent with our arguments, they recognize that the apparent lack of support in their data for the agency
theory could be caused by endogeneity problems, much like the ones we discuss here.
21amounts to adding the usual consumption and productivity improvement motives for perk provi-
sion), then for γ2 small, the optimal amount of the perk completely crowds out explicit incentives.
That is, b∗∗ =0and the employee receives a ﬂat wage. Finally, to the extent that ﬁrms provide
fewer technological perks to independent contractors than to their own employees, and to the ex-
tent that, where such perks are awarded, preventing their misuse for personal consumption is easier
in the case of employees than in the case of independent contractors, Proposition 4 implies that
independent contractors should face stronger explicit incentives.23
5. Applications and extensions
Hayes, Oyer, and Schaefer (2006) suggest that a ﬁrm’s top management should be more appro-
priately viewed as a team rather than a collection of isolated individuals. Also, in the past two
decades, many companies have started to implement innovative work practices, most notable among
them being probably teamwork and employee autonomy, where the latter denotes granting to the
employees ﬂexibility in deciding how to do their job. Furthermore, these two work practices are
considered to be complementary, in the sense that the beneﬁcial eﬀects of organizing employees in
teams are believed to be greater if teamwork is coupled with greater autonomy (see, e.g., DeVaro,
2006, and the references therein). Although a full treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of
this paper, simple extensions of our model allow us to shed some light on optimal perk provision
when agents are organized in teams and on the optimal degree of employee autonomy.
23The idea that ﬁrms might want to provide technological perks to independent contractors is not as peculiar as
it may sound. For example, independent consultants frequently get the use of a ﬁrm’s oﬃces and equipment for the
duration of their assignment. Also, the idea makes perfect sense if the perk is interpreted as the degree of employee
or contractor autonomy.
225.1. Perks in teams
Consider a team consisting of n ≥ 2 members, where for simplicity all agents are assumed identical.
The ﬁrm’s output is given by y(n)=β
Pn
i=1(1+qim)(ai+ε),w h e r exi = qi, ai denotes the variable
pertaining to agent i,a n dε follows the same normal distribution as before.24 Each agent’s contract
is again a linear function of the ﬁrm’s output, i.e., wi(y(n)) = si + biy − piθqiai,w h e r et h et e r m
θqiai is the operating cost of the perk provided to agent i.
This model diﬀers from the single agent setting only in that the variance term is now given by
σ2(n)=n2σ2.25 Since this does not aﬀect the logic of Proposition 1, the perk is provided to the
agents free of charge, p∗(n)=0 , even if the agents form a team. Moreover, the slope of the optimal
contract, b∗(n), and the optimal amount of the perk, q∗(n), are given by (5) and (6) respectively,
with σ2 replaced by σ2(n). Thus, Proposition 2 implies that q∗(n) increases with the team size, n,
i.e., agents in bigger teams should receive more perks.
5.2. Employee autonomy
In recent years, researchers have shown considerable interest in the economics behind the ﬁrms’
decisions whether to delegate decision-making authority to their lower level employees and in the
incentive eﬀects of this decision.26 Similarly, one can ask how much decision-making authority
should be retained by the ﬁrm’s board of directors and how much should be delegated to the
company’s CEO. If workers and managers value autonomy, or derive private beneﬁts from having
24In this formulation, the ﬁrm’s output is additively separable in the agents’ individual outputs and therefore cannot
capture complementarities in production that are central to many discussions of teams in the literature. We do this
for the reasons of tractability and to economize on space, but the logic of the robust comparative statics analysis
based on supermodularity (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1990), leads us to believe that our comparative statics results
with respect to n would only be reinforced by the introduction of complementarities between individual outputs.
25Note that unlike some papers in the literature on teams, we do not impose a balanced budget constraint ˆ b(n) ≤
1/n.T h i sc o u l db ej u s t i ﬁed by assuming that either the agents or the principal serve as the ﬁrm’s budget breakers,
as in Holmström (1982). Alternatively, we could restrict our attention to parameter values such that rσ
2 > 1,i n
which case the constraint would never bind because b
∗(n) ≤ b
∗
0(n) ≤ 1/n for all n.
26Papers in this literature include Aghion and Tirole (1997), Marino and Matsusaka (2005), Prendergast (2002),
Raith (2005), and Zabojnik (2002).
23decision-making authority, as in Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Burkart et al (1997), then "employee
autonomy" quite easily ﬁts the description of a technological perk, as formalized in our model.27,28
There are natural complementarities in an agent’s consumption of the perk/autonomy and his
work activity, and the perk could be also consumed by the agent in connection with non-productive
activities — for example, a manager could use his autonomy to take care of personal errands during
work hours. The variable q would then measure the degree of autonomy granted to the agent, the
parameter m the direct productivity improvement (or decline) due to the agent’s greater decision-
making authority, γ would capture the degree to which the agent values autonomy, and θ would
be the principal’s marginal cost of delegating authority (say, the loss of control over which projects
the agent pursues). This interpretation of our model is in line with the organizational behavior
literature, in which employee autonomy has long been viewed as a motivating beneﬁt. For example,
according to Hackman (1987, p. 324),29 team members are motivated when “the task provides group
members with substantial autonomy for deciding about how they do the work.”
Our earlier analysis then yields the following four insights into the economic forces that deter-
mine the optimal degree of employee autonomy. The ﬁrst three follow from Proposition 2, the last
one from Proposition 3.
(1) First, because q∗ increases in γ,w ec o n ﬁrm the ﬁnding in Aghion and Tirole (1997) that
the degree of autonomy granted to an employee should be greater the greater is the beneﬁtt h e
employee derives from it. In addition, we predict that in this case there should be a negative
relationship between the agent’s degree of autonomy and his formal incentives.
(2) More substantively, our second prediction says that the more diﬃcult it is to measure an
27For example, Google is known for oﬀering many generous perks, but one of the most important is considered to
be that its engineers are allowed to spend 20 percent of their time on pursuing projects of their choice (Lohr, 2005).
28One can also imagine that in some cases the agent might regard autonomy as a burden or a responsibility which
generates net disutility. We consider this case of lesser interest, but our model could formally accommodate it by
reversing the sign on the agent’s utility derived from the perk.
29As cited in DeVaro (2006).
24employee’s performance (i.e., the bigger is σ2), the greater should be the degree of autonomy granted
to the employee. This result is consistent with the ﬁnding in DeVaro (2006), who studies the eﬀects
of autonomy on ﬁnancial performance of teams, and concludes that “the unobserved factors that
make autonomy more likely (given that teams are in use) tend to lower ﬁnancial performance in
the presence of teams.”30 In our model, an increase in σ2 not only makes team autonomy more
likely, but also adversely aﬀects the employee’s overall incentives (by decreasing b∗) and ultimately
the total surplus.31
Also, analogous to our discussion following Proposition 2, all else equal, we would expect the
employees in larger organizations, privately held ﬁrms, in ﬁrms with many inter-dependent divisions,
in geographically dispersed ﬁr m s ,a n di nt h en e we c o n o m yﬁrms to enjoy greater autonomy.
(3) More productive employees (those with greater β), for example the employees higher up
in an organization’s hierarchical ladder, should be given more autonomy. This prediction sounds
quite intuitive and in line with casual empirical observations.
(4) Finally, our model says that employees organized in teams should be given more autonomy
than those engaged in individual production. However, applying the argument discussed in point
(2) above, this does not necessarily mean that teams that have more autonomy should perform
better. Our model can thus reconcile the popular belief among business practitioners, that teams
should be given more autonomy, with the evidence in DeVaro (2006), that there appears to be no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in performance between autonomous and non-autonomous teams.
30DeVaro (2005) reports a similar ﬁnding for labor productivity and product quality as alternative measures of
team performance.
31This can be seen by diﬀerentiating total surplus TS(b,q,p) with respect to σ
2 and applying the Envelope Theorem.
256. Conclusions
Work-related perks appear to represent an important component of employment contracts, with
possible consequences for the structure of observed formal incentives. Moreover, their dual role
as consumption goods and productivity enhancement tools makes these perks open to misuse and
creates scope for agency problems in perk consumption, studied by economists since the ﬁrst for-
malization of the problem by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Yet, a systematic theoretical treatment
of the interplay between the productivity and the consumption motives for perk provision has been
neglected in the extant literature on optimal incentive contracts. The present paper aims to ﬁll this
gap. We point out that a ﬁrm’s provision of a work-related perk can be understood by viewing the
perk as a component of a complex incentive package, designed to optimally balance its conﬂicting
insurance and incentive roles. This approach yields novel predictions regarding the conditions un-
der which technological perks should be provided, the relationship between the provision of perks
and the provision of explicit incentives, the optimal degree of employee autonomy within an orga-
nization, and the eﬀects of the ﬁrm’s corporate governance on agency problems in managerial perk
consumption.
Our framework could be extended in several directions to add more realism. For example,
one could incorporate in it multitasking considerations, viewed by many economists to be equally
important in practice as the concerns about optimal risk-sharing. In such an augmented framework,
we would expect the value of a technological perk to the ﬁrm to depend not only upon how easy it is
to measure the agent’s performance in the task that the perk is associated with, but also upon the
availability of good performance measures for the tasks that are unrelated to the perk but compete
for the agent’s attention.
26Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :Suppose A(b∗,q∗,p ∗) < 0. Then (3) and ∂a
∂p < 0 imply that ∂TS
∂p > 0 for all
q>0. Hence, p∗ = ∞. Similarly, (2) implies that b∗ =0 , because ∂TS
∂b < 0 for all b ≥ 0 when
A(b∗,q∗,p ∗) < 0.U s i n gb∗ =0and p∗ = ∞, we get that A(b∗,q∗,p ∗) < 0 c a no n l yh o l di fq∗ =0 .
Now suppose that A(b∗,q∗,p ∗)=0 . Then (4) implies that ∂TS
∂q < 0 for all q ≥ 0,w h i c hm e a n s
that q∗ =0in this case, too. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) Because the optimization problem is concave, it must be that
∂2TS
∂q2 ≤ 0. Consequently, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for q∗ > 0 is that ∂TS
∂q |q=0 > 0.











0 is given by (1) evaluated at q =0(note that a∗




0). Then, from (5), b∗ > 0 iﬀ q∗ <
β
θ−βm, which always holds from (6). The analysis in
the text proves that q∗ > 0 implies p∗ =0 .
(ii) The above argument implies that q∗ =0for γ ≤ γ∗. The expression for b∗ in part (ii) then
follows from ∂TS
∂b =0evaluated at q∗ =0and p∗ =0(or from (5) evaluated at q∗ =0 ).
Finally, we prove that the FOC(1) has an interior solution when q∗ > 0 and p∗ =0 .T os e et h i s ,
let ﬁrst a =0 .T h e nLHS(1) > 0=RHS(1) because b∗ > 0. On the other hand, if a →∞ ,t h e n
also RHS(1) →∞ ,w h i l eLHS(1) < ∞ because b∗ < 1 always and (6) says that q∗ <
β
θ−βm < ∞.
The existence of a positive but ﬁnite a∗ then follows from continuity of all relevant expressions. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : (i) As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, q∗ > 0 i fa n do n l yi f
condition (a.1) holds. This is obviously more likely to hold the higher is γ. Moreover, because a∗
0
32If TS were not concave in q,t h e n( a . 1 )w o u l db eas u ﬃcient but not always a necessary condition for q
∗ > 0.
27is independent of m and k, γ∗ increases in k and decreases in m. For the rest of the proof, we will







which immediately implies that γ∗ decreases in β, r,a n dσ2, and increases in θ.
(ii) Using g(a)=a2/2,t h eﬁrst order condition (1) yields a∗ = bβ(1 + qm)+γq, which after
substituting in b∗ from (5) becomes
a∗ =
β + γrσ2q − q(θ − βm− γ)
1+rσ2 .
Plugging this into (6) and rearranging, we get that q∗ is given by q∗ = B/D,w h e r e
B ≡ β[γrσ2 − (θ − βm− γ)] − k(1 + rσ2),a n d ( a . 2 )
D ≡ γ(2θ − 2βm− γ)(1 + rσ2) − (θ − βm)2.




D .S i n c eD>0
whenever q∗ > 0,w eh a v et h a tq∗ increases in parameter t if
∂B/∂t− q∗∂D/∂t > 0 (a.3)
and decreases in t if the reverse is true. We now investigate for each of the model’s parameters
whether (a.3) or its reverse holds.
β : Diﬀerentiating (a.2) with respect to β, we see that (a.3) holds iﬀ
[γrσ2 − (θ − βm− γ)] + βm > −2mq∗[γrσ2 − (θ − βm− γ)],
28which always holds because the terms in the square brackets must be positive if q∗ > 0 (since q∗ > 0
implies B>0). Therefore, we get
∂q∗
∂β > 0.
m : We get ∂B/∂m = β2 > 0 and ∂D/∂m =2 β[(θ − βm − γ) − γrσ2] < 0, where the latter
inequality follows because B>0 for q∗ > 0.T h u s ,( a . 3 )a l w a y sh o l d sf o rt = m,s ot h a t
∂q∗
∂m > 0.
θ : In this case, ∂B/∂θ = −β<0 and ∂D/∂θ =2 β[γrσ2 − (θ − βm− γ)] > 0, where the latter
inequality again follows from B>0. Thus, the reverse of (a.3) holds for t = θ,s ot h a t
∂q∗
∂θ < 0.





r and σ2 : These parameters only enter through rσ2.D i ﬀerentiating B and D with respect to
t ≡ rσ2, plugging in for q∗ and rearranging, we see that (a.3) holds iﬀ
γβ(θ − βm− γ) > −k(θ − βm).
Since this always holds, we have that
∂q∗
∂r > 0 and
∂q∗
∂σ2 > 0.
γ : In this case, after substituting for q∗,w eﬁnd that (a.3) is equivalent to
β(1+rσ2)[2γ(θ−βm)−γ2]−β(θ−βm)2−2β(θ−βm−γ)[γrσ2−(θ−βm−γ)]+2k(θ−βm−γ)(1+rσ2) > 0.
Since the left hand side increases in k, the condition holds for all k if it holds for k =0 .B u tw h e n
k =0 , the condition simpliﬁes to (θ − βm− γ)2 + γ2rσ2 > 0, which always holds. Hence,
∂q∗
∂γ > 0.
Comparative statics on b∗. From (5), b∗ decreases in q∗. It is then straightforward to see that
b∗ decreases in γ, r and σ2 and increases in k. On the other hand, θ, β,a n dm, all have both direct
and indirect (through q∗)e ﬀects on b∗ and these work in opposite directions. For example, the
direct eﬀect of θ on b is negative, while the indirect eﬀect, through a smaller q∗, tends to increase
b∗.
29θ : Rewriting (5) to get
b∗ =
1 − θq∗/β(1 + q∗m)
1+rσ2 , (5’)
we see that ∂b∗













Using q∗ = B/D, (a.4) can be written as
q∗
∙








which always holds if the term in square brackets is negative, because ∂B
∂θ = −β. Thus, assume
that the bracketed term is positive. Then the condition holds if
q∗ <
−θ∂B/∂θ
(1 + q∗m)D − θ∂D/∂θ
, (a.5)
Now, from (5), q∗ < 1





(1 + q∗m)D − θ∂D/∂θ
,
which can be rewritten as
D + Bm− θ
∂D
∂θ
<θ (θ − βm).
Since B is the only term in this inequality that depends on k and B decreases in k, the inequality
holds if it holds for k =0 . Setting k =0 , plugging in for D, B,a n d∂D
∂θ , and performing a
few algebraic manipulations, the condition becomes γ + βm > 0, which always holds. Therefore,
∂b∗
∂θ > 0.
30m : Form (5’), we see that ∂b∗


















Plugging in for B and ∂D
∂m from (a.2) and setting k =0(the only eﬀect of k is to decrease the right
hand side of the above inequality), it turns out that B + ∂D
∂m = −B<0.S i n c e D ∂B
∂m > 0,t h i s
means that the condition always holds. Therefore, ∂b∗
∂m < 0.
β : In this case, (5’) implies that ∂b∗








∂β β<1+q∗m.U s i n g








q∗ + D(1 + q∗m). (a.7)




1+rσ2 − (θ − βm− γ)a∗
0.
Note that k∗ < ∞. Next, observe that the left hand side of (a.7) is independent of k,w h i l et h e
right hand side decreases in k (because q∗ decreases in k). Thus, (a.7) holds for all k if it holds for
k = k∗.S i n c eb y d e ﬁnition of k∗ we have q∗ =0when k = k∗,as u ﬃcient condition for (a.7) to
hold is that ∂B
∂β <D 2 when evaluated at q∗ =0 .D i ﬀerentiating B with respect to β,w eg e tt h a t
∂B
∂β = B
β − βm. Because q∗ = B/D =0requires that B =0 , we only need −βm < D2,w h i c hi s
always satisﬁed. Hence, ∂b∗
∂β > 0. ¥




= β(1 + qm),
∂a1
∂q













Substituting from (7) and (8), we can deﬁne
A1 ≡ ∂TS/∂a1 =( 1− b)β(1 + qm) − (1 − p)qθ,
A2 ≡ ∂TS/∂a2 = −(1 − p)qθ.



























− rb2β2(1 + qm)mσ2 − k − (θ − βm− γ1)a1 − (θ − γ2)a2.
Suppose p∗∗ > 0 and q∗∗ > 0. Then p∗∗ is determined by ∂TS
∂p =0 , which, together with
∂a1
∂p = ∂a2
∂p , yields A1 = −A2 = θ(1 − p∗∗)q∗∗, which implies A1(q =0 )=A2(q =0 )=0 .N o w ,t h e
concavity of TS in q implies that ∂TS
∂q > 0 when evaluated at p∗∗ and q =0 .B u t
∂TS
∂q
|q=0 = −rb2β2mσ2 − k − (θ − βm− γ1)bβ < 0,
which contradicts the requirement that ∂TS
∂q > 0. Hence, if q∗∗ > 0, then it must be p∗∗ =0 .
32Given that p∗∗ > 0, the ﬁrst order conditions for b∗∗ and q∗∗ yield
b∗∗ =
1 − θq∗∗/β(1 + q∗∗m)
1+rσ2 , (a.8)
q∗∗ =
β[γ1(1 + rσ2)+βm− θ] − k(1 + rσ2)
[(2θ − 2βm− γ1)γ1 +( 2 θ − γ2)γ2](1 + rσ2) − (θ − βm)2. (a.9)
The corresponding condition for b∗ is identical except for the appearance of q∗ in the place of q∗∗
and the condition for q∗ is as in (a.9) with γ2 =0 . Thus, equation (a.9) implies that q∗ >q ∗∗
and by the fact that the right side of (a.8) is decreasing in q, we have that b∗∗ >b ∗. Because
q∗ = q∗∗(γ2 =0 )and the numerator of (a.9) does not depend upon γ2,i tm u s tb et h a tq∗∗ > 0 if
a n do n l yi fq∗ > 0. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :From θ>γ 2,w eh a v et h a t(2θ − γ2)γ2 increases in γ2.U s i n g ( a . 9 ) ,
this means that q∗∗ decreases in γ2, which in turn implies that b∗∗ increases in γ2,b e c a u s eγ2 only
aﬀects b∗∗ through q∗∗ and b∗∗ decreases in q∗∗. Also, it is immediate that q∗∗ decreases in k,w h i c h
then implies that b∗∗ increases in k because b∗∗ only depends on k through q∗∗. To get the rest of
the comparative statics results, write q∗ as q∗ = B/D,a si nt h ep r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 ,a n dq∗∗ as
q∗∗ = B/D0,w h e r e
B ≡ β[γ1(1 + rσ2)+βm− θ] − k(1 + rσ2),
D ≡ [(2θ − 2βm− γ1)γ1 +( 2 θ − γ2)γ2](1 + rσ2) − (θ − βm)2,a n d
D0 ≡ D + γ2(2θ − γ2)(1 + rσ2).
Comparative statics on q∗∗. For any parameter t,w eh a v et h a t
∂q∗∗
∂t > 0 if and only if D0 ∂B
∂t −
33B ∂D0



















∂t > 0,t h e nD∂B
∂t − B ∂D
∂t > 0 so that to establish
∂q∗∗
∂t > 0 it will be suﬃcient to show that







γ2(2θ − γ2)(1 + rσ2)
¢
> 0.( a . 1 0 )
Similarly, if
∂q∗
∂t < 0,t h e nD∂B
∂t − B ∂D
∂t < 0 and it is enough to show that















∂β > 0, we only need to show that (a.10) holds for t = β. In this case, (a.10) becomes
γ2(2θ − γ2)(1 + rσ2)[γ1(1 + rσ2)+2 βm − θ] > 0,w h i c hi sa l w a y ss a t i s ﬁed because θ>γ 2 and





∂m > 0 means that we only need to check (a.10) for t = m,w h i c hi nt h i sc a s e
becomes γ2(2θ − γ2)(1 + rσ2)β2 > 0, which again holds. Hence,
∂q∗∗
∂m > 0.
θ : In this case,
∂q∗
∂θ < 0, so we need to show that (a.11) holds for t = θ. This condition becomes





∂γ > 0 means that we only need to check that (a.10) is satisﬁed. For γ1, this condition is
γ2(2θ − γ2)(1 + rσ2)βγ1(1 + rσ2) > 0, which holds. Therefore,
∂q∗∗
∂γ > 0.
rσ2 : Diﬀerentiating B and D0 with respect to rσ2 and rearranging, we see that the condition
34D0 ∂B
∂t − B ∂D0
∂t > 0 holds iﬀ
βγ1 − k>q ∗∗[(2θ − 2βm− γ1)γ1 +( 2 θ − γ2)γ2].
Plugging in q∗∗ = B/D0, rearranging again, and cancelling out terms, this condition simpliﬁes to
θ − βm− γ1 > 0, which holds by assumption. This yields
∂q∗∗
∂r > 0 and
∂q∗∗
∂σ2 > 0.
Comparative statics on b∗∗. For convenience, we reproduce here the expression for b∗∗:
b∗∗ =
1 − θq∗∗/β(1 + q∗∗m)
1+rσ2 . (a.12)
First, notice from (5’) and (a.12) that b∗∗ is the same function of q∗∗ as b∗ is of q∗,a n dt h a tb∗∗
decreases in q∗∗. It is then immediate that b∗ decreases in γ1, r and σ2.
On the other hand, as with the eﬀects of θ, β and m on b∗, all of these parameters have both
direct and indirect (through q∗)e ﬀects on b∗∗ that work in opposite directions.
θ : The direct eﬀect of θ on b∗∗ is negative, while the indirect eﬀect, through a smaller q∗∗, tends
to increase b∗∗. From (a.12), we see that ∂b∗∗












.( a . 1 3 )












∂θ ,i . e .i f
D0 ∂B




∂θ − B ∂D
∂θ
D02 .





∂θ , which reduces to condition (a.11) for t = θ. As we have shown above,
this condition holds. Hence, (a.14) holds, which means that ∂b∗∗
∂θ > 0.
m : From (a.12), we have that ∂b∗∗






> 0, which holds iﬀ
∂q∗∗
∂m
> (q∗∗)2.( a . 1 5 )







Since from the proof of Proposition 2 we know that D ∂B
∂m >B (B + ∂D
∂m), and because D0 >D>0,
∂B
∂m > 0, B>0,a n d∂D0
∂m = ∂D
∂m, the above condition must hold. Therefore, ∂b∗∗
∂m < 0.
β : In this case, (a.12) implies that ∂b∗∗








∂β β<1+q∗∗m.U s i n g






B + D0(D0 + Bm).( a . 1 6 )
Again, from the proof of Proposition 2 we have that ∂B
∂β < ∂B
∂βB +D(D +Bm). Thus, (a.16) holds
because ∂B
∂β > 0,B>0,a n dD0 >D>0. Hence, ∂b∗
∂β > 0. ¥
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